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Preface 
This paper is written as part of the NAV-evaluation, funded by the Research Council of 
Norway. It is also linked to the project «Reforming the Welfare State: Democracy, 
Accountability and Management, funded by the VAM program, the Research Council of 
Norway». The research leading to these results has also received funding from the 
European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement No. 
266887 (Project COCOPS), Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities», Work Package 5 
– The governance of social cohesion: innovative coordination practices in public 
management. The paper was prepared for the 34th Annual EGPA Conference, the 
Study Group on «Governance of Public Sector Organizations», Bergen, 6–9 September 
2012. 
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Abstract 
The merger of the employment and national insurance administrations and the 
collaboration between this new administration and local social services is one of the 
largest public-sector reforms ever to take place in Norway. The aims of the reform are 
to get passive beneficiaries back into work and activity and to make the administration 
more user-friendly, holistic and efficient. These aims are to be achieved by increasing 
the administration’s capacity to address so called «wicked issues» by cutting across 
existing policy fields and territorial levels. The joined-up-government approach of this 
reform poses three main challenges: 1) to get a merged central government agency to 
work, 2) to establish constructive cooperation between the central and local authorities 
and 3) to coordinate front-line services with user-oriented employment and welfare 
offices. The paper discusses the experience gained from these three challenges five years 
into the reform process. The reform can hardly be proclaimed a success given its aims. 
The idea of increasing the capacity of government to cut across existing policy fields and 
handle trans boundary wicked issues is still struggling to be implemented. Cooperation 
between sectors seems to be easier to achieve than cooperation between levels. 
Experience has also revealed that the joined-up-government-approach of the reform 
tends to make accountability relations more blurred and ambiguous. 
Sammendrag 
Sammenslåingen av Aetat og Rikstrygdeverket og partnerskapsavtalen mellom denne 
nye statlige etaten og de kommunale sosiale tjenestene er en av største 
forvaltningsreformene som er gjennomført i Norge. Målene med reformen var å få flere 
over fra trygd til arbeid og å gjøre den nye forvaltningen mer brukervennlig, helhetlig og 
effektiv. Disse målene skulle oppnås ved å styrke forvaltningens kapasitet til å håndtere 
de vanskelige problemene som går på tvers av eksisterende policy-områder og 
forvaltningsnivå. Den mer helhetlige tilnærmingen bak denne reformen står overfor tre 
hovedutfordringer: 1) å få den sammenslåtte etaten til å fungere, 2) å etablere et 
konstruktivt samarbeid mellom sentrale og kommunale myndigheter, 3) å koordinere 
førstelinje tjenester knyttet til sosialhjelp, arbeid og trygd. Dette notatet diskuterer 
erfaringer i forhold til disse tre utfordringene fem år inn i reformprosessen. Reformen 
kan så langt knapt erklæres som en suksess i forhold til målene med den. Ideen med økt 
kapasitet for å håndtere saker som går på tvers av policy-områder og forvaltningsnivåer 
strever fortsatt med å bli iverksatt. Samarbeid mellom politikkområder ser ut til å være 
enklere å oppnå enn samarbeid mellom forvaltningsnivåer. Erfaringer har også avdekket 
at den helhetlige reformtilnærmingen gjør ansvarsrelasjonene mindre skarpe og mer 
tvetydige.  
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Introduction 
The merger of the employment and national insurance administrations into a new employment 
and welfare administration called NAV is one of the largest reforms of public-sector 
coordination in recent Norwegian administrative history (Christensen, Fimreite and 
Lægreid 2007). The reform also introduced formal collaboration between the merged 
central government administration and the local government social services administration. 
The NAV offices – situated in each of Norway’s 429 municipalities – constitute a one-
stop shop system where services from NAV are integrated with the local social services 
administration. This front-line office is organized as a central–local partnership 
regulated by local agreements. Central government does not, however, assume local 
government responsibilities or vice versa. The reform is therefore also an important 
component of multi-level governance. 
The aims of the reform are to get more passive beneficiaries back into work and 
activity and to make the administration more user-friendly, holistic and efficient. These 
aims are to be achieved by increasing the capacity of the administration to address so 
called «wicked issues» that cut across existing policy fields and territorial levels. The idea 
is that the NAV reform will improve the welfare system through vertical and horizontal 
coordination in policymaking, implementation and service provision. 
Many aspects of this reform have already been examined, including the reform 
process and the challenges of coordination (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007), 
the partnership arrangement (Fimreite and Lægreid 2009, Askim, Fimreite, Mosley and 
Pedersen 2011), how to carry out joined-up-government reforms (Askim, Christensen, 
Fimreite and Lægreid 2009), the reorganization of the reform (Christensen and Lægreid, 
2012c), the hybridity and complexity of the reform (Christensen and Lægreid 2011a), 
accountability issues (Christensen and Lægreid 2011b) and how to assess joined-up 
government reforms (Askim, Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2010). Many of these 
studies focus on the processes and content of the reform and do not pay much 
attention to the actual experience, effects and implications of the reform. This is also the 
case more generally in research on collaborations and partnerships in the social sector, 
which have concentrated heavily on process issues and paid less attention to analyzing 
outcomes, failures or successes (Dowling, Powell and Glendinning 2004).  
It is now time to go beyond the process approach and ask whether joined-up 
government is delivering on its promises. This is the main focus in this paper, which 
discusses three challenges in the joined-up government initiative and examines how 
these are being handled five years after the reform was introduced. The three challenges 
were identified at the point when the NAV reform was about to be launched 
(Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007) and are: 1) to get a merged central 
government agency based on established agencies with very different cultures, tasks and 
professions to work, 2) to establish constructive cooperation between the central and 
local authorities and 3) to create a new coordinated front-line service with user-oriented 
employment and welfare offices all over the country. Drawing on experiences 
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highlighted by an on-going evaluation program,2 our main research question is to 
describe and analyse how the three challenges have been met in the first five years of the 
NAV reform. The focus when analysing these challenges will be whole-of-government 
approaches to reforms and in particular the implications for accountability relations 
such reforms imply. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss the context for implementation 
of the reform. Second, we describe the concept of joined-up government and the NAV 
reform as a joined-up government arrangement. Third, we address the three challenges 
the reform faces and discuss the findings in terms of the principles of joined-up-
government and accountability relations. Finally we identify some implications.  
The  No rweg i an  c on t ex t   
Norway is a unitary, parliamentary and multi-party state with a small population spread 
over a rather large geographical area. Since 2005 it has been ruled by a Red–Green 
majority coalition government. There is a strong democratic tradition in Norway and 
collectivist and egalitarian values are important (Christensen 2003). Consensus is crucial, 
the level of internal conflicts is low, and corporatist arrangements are well developed. 
Per capita income is relatively high and there is an abundance of natural resources. The 
level of labour market participation in Norway is high, also among women and elderly 
people. The unemployment rate is one of the lowest in Europe (2.6 percent in March 
2012) while the disability insurance rate is rather high (9.7 percent in May 2012). Three 
percent of people receiving disability insurance are under thirty years of age. The 
majority of disability insurance recipients are between fifty and seventy years of age (the 
latest retirement age in Norway is 70) (NAV 2012). 
Norway has a significant tradition of local self-government. Local authorities with 
their own elected democratic institutions have wide competencies. The Norwegian 
welfare state is one of the most comprehensive and universal in the world, with a large 
                                                 
2 The evaluation program is organized under the National Research Council but financed by the 
Ministry of Employment. The funding is 5.2 million EUR over six years. The program was launched 
in 2007 and will be finished in 2013. The program is coordinated by the Uni Rokkan Centre in 
Bergen, but seven other institutions are also involved. The evaluation program has seven working 
packages (WPs) focusing on: 1) The Norwegian welfare model, governance system and NAV, 2) The 
local NAV office, 3) Implementation at local level, 4) The staff at local level – a new profession in 
NAV? 5) The back-to-work policy – more people in activity? 6) The clients` objective and subjective 
experiences with NAV and 7) Productivity – more welfare for money? WPs 1–4 focus on the process 
of implementing NAV and WPs, 5–7 have more of an effect focus. The WPs started at different 
times, 1–4 in 2007 and 5–7 in 2010/11. This paper will present results mainly from WP 1–4. The 
methods used in the WPs are: document analysis, in-depth interviews with involved actors at central, 
local and office level, data archives documenting agreements between central and local government, 
web surveys of CEOs and mayors in all Norwegian municipalities, observation studies, surveys of 
users and official statistics. There is no separate data collection for this particular paper. When we 
refer to «our data» it is data collected by the researchers in the evaluation program as such. For more 
information about the evaluation program see: www.rokkan.uni.no/nav 
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public sector. In the Norwegian model welfare policies are mostly decided at the central 
level, but they are adapted to local circumstances and implemented by local government. 
Local government is responsible for social welfare, primary schools, care of the elderly 
and primary health care and thus constitutes a major part of the public sector both in 
terms of the number of employees and in terms of financial resources. The relationship 
between central and local government is a mixture of political decentralisation, based on 
the principle of local autonomy, and administrative decentralisation, based on the 
principle of delegated authority. 
Political control over the civil service has been general and passive, allowing the 
executive considerable leeway. This seems to reflect some major features of the 
political–administrative system: high levels of mutual trust and shared attitudes and 
norms among political and administrative leaders, within the public sector in general and 
in the relationship between central and local authorities (Christensen and Lægreid 2005; 
Fimreite, Flo, Tranvik and Aars 2004). The level of trust in public institutions in 
Norway is generally higher than in most other countries (Norris 1999).  
In Norway administrative reforms at the central level have generally neglected 
cooperation across sectors. Major reform measures, such as performance management, 
performance auditing, monitoring and control, have first and foremost been directed at 
the vertical, sector-based dimension of public administration, reflecting a strong 
historical trajectory (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). Other reform measures, such as 
structural devolution through the formation of state-owned companies and semi-
autonomous regulatory agencies, have increased fragmentation and challenged vertical 
coordination. As a result of these movements, horizontal coordination between sectors 
has become more difficult at the central level. One consequence is that it is difficult to 
establish cross-ministerial cooperation in policy areas (Fimreite and Lægreid 2005).  
By contrast, reform tendencies at the local level in Norway are more or less the 
opposite. In municipalities sectors have formally been merged and specialization 
principles other than sectorial have become more important. Local horizontal 
coordination has become easier, but at the same time the sector-based relationship 
between the central and local levels has suffered (Tranvik and Fimreite 2006). When the 
sectorial principle ceases to be the main mechanism at the lowest level, coordination 
between levels becomes a challenge.  
The NAV reform proposed to meet this challenge by formally integrating services 
that are both central government (employment and national insurance administration) 
and local government (social services) responsibilities. The multi-level aspect is further 
emphasized by the fact that different government levels have to coordinate tasks at the 
same territorial level in the «one-stop-shop» arrangements in municipalities (Askim, 
Fimreite, Moseley and Pedersen 2011). These reform features can be said to correspond 
with joined-up-government aspects. We will therefore discuss this concept further and 
relate the NAV reform more directly to such a discussion. 
 
WP 6 –  2012 REFORM CHALLENGES,  EXPERIENCES  AND ACCOUNTABIL ITY  RELATIONS 
8 
Joined-up-government  
The  c oncep t  
Traditionally public sector organizations have been concerned with achieving their own 
specific objectives, reflecting funding and responsibilities which they can directly 
control. This can result in agencies adopting an overly narrow, ‘silo’ approach which 
does not consider the trans boundary challenges that cut across traditional 
responsibilities for such difficult issues as long-term unemployment and social 
deprivation (Pollitt 2003). Attempts to coordinate government policy-making and 
service delivery across organizational boundaries are not a new phenomenon (Ling 
2002, Kavanagh and Richards 2001). The «siloization» or «pillarization» of the public 
sector seems to have increased in the NPM era, however (Gregory 2006, Pollitt 2003). 
The principle of «single-purpose organizations,» with many specialized and non-
overlapping roles and functions, has produced fragmentation, self-centred authorities 
and a lack of cooperation and coordination, hence hampering effectiveness and 
efficiency (Boston and Eicbaum 2005: 21).  
An answer to this is what in the literature is called a joined-up-government-approach. The 
joined-up-government concept does not represent a coherent set of ideas and tools but 
can best be seen as an umbrella term describing a set of responses to the problem of 
increased fragmentation of the public sector and public services and a wish to increase 
coordination (Ling 2002). Joined-up-government is an elusive term that has been used 
as a label for a variety of overlapping strategies. Pollitt (2003:35) has adopted a broad 
definition of joined-up-government as the aspiration to achieve horizontally and 
vertically coordinated thinking and action. It overlaps to a great extent with the «Whole-
of-Government»-approach used in Australia, reflecting new labels for the doctrine of 
coordination of public administration (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). Some authors 
also call joined-up-government a post-NPM-initiative (Christensen and Lægreid (2010, 
2012a). Joined-up-government is defined by the National Audit Office as «bringing 
together a number of public, private and voluntary sector bodies to work across 
organizational boundaries towards a common goal» (NAO 2001:1). In this paper we 
look at joined-up government mainly by focusing on cooperation between government 
agencies rather than using the broader meaning of joined-up governance, which also 
includes deciding policy or service delivery issues with civil society (Boston and Gill 
2011). 
The main motives for joining up are a) to get a broader view, so that ministries, 
agencies and local service centres make a better contribution to cross-cutting programs 
for client groups; b) to reduce conflicts between different policies and tackle intractable 
social issues by promoting programs that are better interconnected and mutually 
supportive; c) to create seamless services, improving service delivery through ‘one-stop 
shops’, call centres and accessible websites; d) to promote innovation by bringing 
together people with different backgrounds, professions and experiences; and e) to 
make better use of resources and improve cost-effectiveness by removing overlaps and 
realizing economies of scale (Pollitt 2003, GAO 2001). 
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Sue Richards (2001) distinguishes between three types of joining up. First intractable or 
«wicked» policy problems in which both the problem and the solution have a situational 
character. Such problems cut across administrative levels as well as agency boundaries 
and are deeply rooted in the cultural and economic structures of society (Hodges 2012). 
The issues of social exclusion are focused and no one knows how to solve these 
problems in a general way, but often a decentralized governance approach is what is 
needed. Second, tame problems situated on the boundaries between different 
organizations, in which solutions are known or where it is possible to find evidence-
based answers. These problems are client-specific rather than situational. For such 
problems a top–down strategy would be more applicable, requiring partnerships that 
operate across silo structures. Third seamless service in which recent advancements in ICT 
technology permit better service access and delivery. Call centre and internet services are 
key structures and the governance system can be rather centralized. While the first two 
types focus on outcome-based performance, the last is more output related.  
The implication of this differentiated approach to joining up is that it represents 
broad umbrella concepts that address different sets of problems requiring different 
approaches to solve them (Richards 2001). It can be said that the NAV reform intends 
to address all these three types of joining up, implying a need for both centralized and 
decentralized approaches and specialization by geography, by clients, by process and by 
tasks or purpose (Gulick 1937). 
Two issues are particularly relevant when discussing joined-up-government from an 
organizational design perspective – the intensity and scope of working together (Boston 
and Gill 2011). The scope of joined-up-government can be analysed along several 
dimensions. One can distinguish between temporary and permanent arrangements, 
between joined-up-government policy-making and joined-up-government 
implementation and between horizontal linkages and vertical linkages; moreover, the 
targets for joined-up-government initiatives can be a group, a locality or a policy sector 
(Pollitt 2003). Joined-up-government activities may span any or all levels of government 
and also involve groups outside government. It is about joining up at the top, but also 
about joining up at the base, enhancing local level integration and involving public-
private partnerships. In our case we examine a version of joined-up-government with a 
rather broad scope: The arrangements are permanent, they address both policy making 
and service delivery, they have both a vertical and a horizontal reach and they cover all 
levels of government.  
Regarding intensity, joined-up-government can take many forms such as realigning 
organizational boundaries by merging two or more organizations, creating formal 
partnerships governed by contracts or framework agreements or engaging in informal 
partnerships that work on the basis of consultation or unwritten mutual agreement 
(NAO 2001). In our case we mainly focus on different public sector organizations that 
have been brought together by mergers and formal partnerships. Boston and Gill (2011) 
distinguish between the following forms of inter-governmental integration along a 
formal/high intensity-informal/low intensity dimension: Collaboration (shared 
responsibilities), coordination (shared work), cooperation (shared resources), 
communication (shared information) and coexistence (self-reliance). Normally higher 
intensity implies more shared accountability relations, which pose more complicated and 
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ambiguous accountability challenges (Boston and Gill 2011). In our case we address 
high intensity formal collaboration.  
NAV  a s  a  j o i n ed -up -gove rnmen t  i n i t i a t i v e  –  
f e a t u r e s  and  cha l l e nges  
Some elements of the NAV reform definitely resemble some features of NPM. This 
applies particularly to the performance management system, the focus on users and on 
efficiency in provision of services. The reform is, however, even more closely related to 
post-NPM features (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). The reform’s strong emphasis on 
integrating service administrations from different administrative sectors and territorial 
levels makes it easy to classify it as an attempt to introduce a joined-up-government 
approach to the Norwegian welfare system.  
First, a front-line service with an employment and welfare office was established in 
every municipality. Legally the front-line service is based on a binding agreement 
between the central and local authorities laid down in local cooperation agreements. 
Although it is not referred to as such in the act regulating the NAV reform, this 
collaboration is described as and also now called a partnership. The partnership between 
central and local government was designed to provide coordinated services better 
adapted to users’ needs and to replace the former system of three different offices at 
local level. A network of local offices constitute a coordinated front-line service with 
responsibility for employment, sick leave, medical and occupational rehabilitation, 
disability pensions, financial social assistance, pensions and family benefits. The main 
coordination mechanism between levels and sectors here is the network, but it is aided 
by co-location and formalization.  
Second, central government responsibility is concentrated in one ministry and one 
agency: the employment and welfare service (NAV). The former Labour Market 
Administration and the National Insurance Service were abolished and a new 
government agency was established whose regional branches co-operate closely with the 
individual local authorities. The main coordination mechanism is structural integration.  
A third (and additional) organizational change was introduced in 2008 when the 
regional and local levels were reorganized. Six pension units and thirty-seven 
administrative units were established at regional level. The purpose of these units is to 
handle standardized services and also services provided to citizens as individual rights. 
The NAV reform started as a structural integration process in 2005, involving merging 
and partnership, but since the 2008 reorganization a more hybrid profile has emerged 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2012b). The process – from applications, through decisions to 
follow clients up – is now more specialized across levels, but the new system also 
exhibits some post-NPM features that take the form of more structural integration, 
gathering more resources and staff at the regional level. 
This new welfare administration system is a radical departure from the original 
employment and welfare administration (Christensen et al. 2007, Christensen 2008). It 
represents a complicated organizational arrangement and division of responsibility 
between central and local authorities. Political responsibility for the national insurance 
service as well as for labour market policy remains with central government while 
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financial social assistance remains a discretion-based, means-tested benefit under 
municipal management. However, the coordination between the three services at local 
level and the one-stop-shop idea represent challenges for services and government 
levels that are used to maintain a certain degree of territorial as well as cultural distance.  
Joined-up-government initiatives, such as the NAV reform approach, have a strong 
positive symbolic flavour and are generally seen as a good thing. But it is also important 
to point out that the «silo mentalities» these reform initiatives are supposed to bridge, 
exist for good reasons (Page 2005). Well-defined vertical and horizontal organizational 
boundaries should not only be seen as a symptom of obsolescent thinking (Pollitt 2003). 
Division of labour and specialization are inevitable features of modern organizations, 
implying that coordinative initiatives will be difficult to implement. Working 
horizontally is a very time- and resource-consuming activity.  
The reform approach in NAV also raises other difficulties connected to ambitious 
agendas and uncontrolled consequences (6 et al. 2002). There is a tension between 
joined-up-government initiatives and performance-management systems (Pollitt 2003b). 
Performance management has encouraged individuals as well as organizations to meet 
their own performance targets, and there has been a tendency towards some 
fragmentation of organizational forms. In contrast, the NAV aims to promote co-
operation, networks, cross-boundary targets and collaboration between organizations.  
The three challenges we identified in 2007 are all related to the above-mentioned 
considerations (Christensen et al. 2007). As the reform has been implemented, all three 
challenges have turned out to have implications for accountability issues, and this is a 
central concern of the joined-up-government initiative that we will pursue further in this 
paper. A key question is how one can have joint action, common standards and shared 
systems, on the one hand, and vertical accountability for individual agency performance 
on the other (Lægreid 2013). Lines of accountability are not entirely clarified. The 
challenge is to achieve a better balance between vertical accountability to central 
government, horizontal accountability to local government and to agencies in other 
related policy areas, like health, and responsiveness downwards to users and clients 
(Ryan and Walsh 2004). Different accountability mechanisms are activated to handle the 
accountability to whom question, such as political accountability 
(government/Parliament or political/administrative leadership), 
administrative/managerial accountability (internal control or external scrutiny body), 
professional accountability (professional norms) and social accountability 
(government/user or general public) (Bovens 2007, Christensen and Lægreid 2011a).  
In the following section we will discuss how the three challenges have been handled 
and also how they are related to the important accountability relations elaborated above.  
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Three challenges – mixed experiences 
Cha l l enge  1  –  To  ge t  a  me rged  c en t r a l  g ove rnmen t  
agency  t o  wo r k  
Merging the two original central agencies into one huge agency has been challenging for 
NAV (Christensen 2008). This challenge is related to costs, cultural features and 
collaboration. First, concerning costs, there is on the one hand obvious potential for 
economies-of-scale in the merger. However, the reform itself cost a huge amount of 
money and all employees were guaranteed that they would keep their jobs, so this part 
of the efficiency equation has obviously been problematic.  
Second, two entities with long and separate histories and different (and also strong 
and distinctive) organizational cultures have been merged. After five years there are clear 
indications that this integration operation has been relatively successful and also fairly 
harmonious at the central level. Few severe conflicts have been observed (Christensen 
2008). While there have been few conflicts between the directors in the new agency and 
the political and administrative leaders in the Ministry of Labour, there have been some 
minor disagreements about how detailed the steering from the ministry should be. 
Whether this is related to the reform or to more permanent features in the relationship 
between ministries and agencies is not easy to conclude. At the operative level, there 
have been a number of discussions and also disagreements particularly in the agency. 
These discussions have addressed additional, in some cases controversial changes in the 
organizational structure that have taken place during the reform process, such as the 
integration of a separate delivery unit into the directorate (Simlenes 2011). Another 
conflict was related to whether the new administrative units at the regional level should 
be in the line organization (which was what eventually happened) or whether they 
should belong to a central unit for special administrative units, like the new regional 
pension units (Christensen 2011). 
Third, actors at the central level, in the new NAV agency and in the Ministry of 
Labour whom we interviewed in the initial phase of the reform expressed a strong belief 
in the idea behind the reform. They were also supportive of the idea that public-sector 
reforms, particularly those in the public welfare sector, can be advanced by changing the 
organizational structure (Christensen 2008). Respondents at this level continued to be 
optimistic about organizational changes as a reform tool when they were re-interviewed 
in 2010.  
The reorganization of the reform in 2008 also had relevance for making the merged 
central agency work. One of the basic ideas behind the reorganization was to be more 
efficient, increase the quality of casework and improve the rights of the clients by 
creating larger units at the regional level. Our respondents at central government level 
seem to support the view that this is mainly what has happened (Christensen 2011). It is 
a more open question whether this reorganization has benefited the local welfare 
offices. 
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Cha l l enge  2  –  To  e s t ab l i s h  c ons t r u c t i v e  
c oope r a t i on  be tween  t he  c en t r a l  and  l o ca l  
au tho r i t i e s  
Actors at the central level are concerned not so much about what is going on at the 
central level as about the relationship between the central and local levels and also about 
what really (as they themselves express it) takes place in the local NAV offices. For this 
reason they advocate more standardization and less variation between local NAV offices 
(Fimreite 2011). This implies that they want local government to play the role of 
implementer of policies decided at the central level in the partnership between central 
and local government. Local self-government was not mentioned at all when central 
actors reflected on the partnership between central and local government in NAV in our 
in-depth interviews (Fimreite 2008). In other words, they see the partnership as one-
sided. 
Since the partnership between central and local government was designed in the 
NAV, local government is free to include services and tasks other than the compulsory 
social services in the local office. The majority of municipalities (94 percent) do so. 
Which services or tasks are added varies from municipality to municipality, however 
(Aars 2011). The freedom to organize the local office to fit local needs and challenges 
also includes the right to decide whether the local office should be headed by a unitary 
manager taking care of both central and local government services or whether there 
should be a manager for each side. 93 percent of the municipalities have chosen a 
unitary local manager, while divided leadership is used in some of the big cities. The 
result of this freedom is that at the local level the NAV is a different organization in 
different municipalities. This is part of the reason why actors at the central level 
accentuate the need for more standardization and less variation when they assess what is 
taking place locally (Fimreite 2011).  
Few conflicts between the central and local levels were reported in the process of 
establishing local NAV offices or during their first operational phase. Actors at the local 
level, however, also regard the relationship between the central and local levels as an 
important challenge for the NAV reform (Fimreite 2011). The role of local government 
in the NAV partnership is not seen primarily as local self government. A web survey of 
political and administrative leaders in Norwegian municipalities in 2011 revealed that 
NAV is regarded by local leaders as an administrative task. Our data show that there has 
been less attention from the local council and from individual local politicians since the 
agreement was signed and the local offices began operating (Aars 2011). Three out of 
five respondents in the survey also said that their local NAV-office – their particular 
partnership with central government – was a success, some even classified it as a great 
success. They also claimed that local NAV offices collaborate well with other local 
government services and tasks that are not included in the partnership (Aars 2011).  
When the partnership was assessed in more abstract terms as a way of organizing the 
relationship between central and local government, it was, however, considered 
problematic. One reason for this may be that more than 70 percent of the local leaders 
in the survey believe that the central level has the superior role in the partnership. Local 
actors interpret this as meaning that their role in the partnership is that of an underdog.  
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The way the local NAV office is organized implies that there is a central–local 
relationship, not only between levels, but also inside each office. The evaluation 
program reveals that this integration process has been gradual. There has likewise been a 
step-by-step integration between central government services and local government 
services at office level. The evaluation program shows, however, that the partners are 
now moving towards mutual dependence and a growing flexibility at both levels when it 
comes to providing the other level’s services (Alm Andreassen and Fossestøl 2009, 
2011). At the same time as this integration took place, there was also a recentralization 
process related to the reorganization of the reform in 2008 and the establishment of 
new specialized regional units to improve standardization, quality, efficiency and rights 
(Christensen 2011, Christensen and Lægreid 2011). Now that these administrative units 
have been operating for a few years, only one out of four officers at local level say they 
have more time to take care of users now than they did before the units were introduced 
(Alm Andreassen 2011). 
Cha l l e nge s  3  –  To  c oo rd i na t e  f r on t - l i n e  s e r v i c e  
w i t h  u se r - o r i en t ed  we l f a r e  o f f i c e s  
The managers at local NAV offices with whom we conducted in-depth interviews say 
they have not had enough time to develop the internal organization of the local office 
during the implementation process. Their priority has been the relationship with the 
central level in the NAV. They have worked hard to meet the goals and objectives that 
have arisen as part of the central level efforts to steer and control downwards in NAV. 
As the local managers see it, this has been rather unfortunate for the users of the local 
NAV offices, for, as they themselves admit, there has not been enough focus from their 
side on the relationship between the local NAV organization and users (Alm 
Andreassen and Fossestøl 2011). Five years into the process the managers say more 
attention has to be given to the relationship between the NAV organization and the 
users rather than just to the internal relationships in the NAV. Local managers say 
openly in interviews that they have had to choose between implementing the aims of the 
reform and operating the local organization (Klemsdal 2011). Now they say it is time to 
focus more broadly on the aims of the reform, including at office level. Problems 
related to integration of ICT systems can have aggravated this situation. The reform was 
launched more or less without any joint ICT systems. In in-depth-interviews actors at 
local level reveal that they have had to struggle to cope with four or five different old 
ICT systems for their services (Røiseland and Vabo 2012:141–145). The pension reform 
that happened at the same time as the reorganization of the reform in 2008, however, 
brought with it a new IT system, which improved services in this newly specialized part 
of the reform but did not solve the overall IT problems (Førde 2010). 
Integration at office level was not just meant to take place through changes in 
organizational structure. The professional workers from each coordinated 
administration were also important ‘elements’ in the integration. The original idea was 
that all staff members (officers at the employment and insurance service administrations 
and social workers in the social services) should be able to handle all tasks and provide 
every service that was assigned to the office. Very early in the implementation process it 
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was revealed that it was challenging to establish this sort of generalist competence 
among the staff at office level (Helgøy, Kildal and Nilssen 2011). Interviews conducted 
in 2011 showed that re-specialization and in some places even new specialization was 
taking place (Helgøy, Kildal and Nilssen 2011). The re-specialization is based on the old 
demarcations between the original services included in the NAV. The new specialization 
follows different principles of specialization to those of group or purpose. Some offices 
have established family teams, for instance, while in others we find youth teams, each 
with dedicated staff members. One possible reason why the generalist model has not 
been an immediate success is that the in-house-training of staff that the local NAVs 
used to rely on so heavily has not always been sufficient. Local staff members are, 
however, still quite positive about the ideas behind the reform, although the percentage 
which is supportive declined from 80 in 2008 to under 60 in 2011 (Alm Andreassen 
2011). Reform fatigue and in some cases disappointment with what has been achieved 
so far have been offered as explanations for this decline. 
User satisfaction with NAV shows a downward tendency in the period from 2007 to 
2010, but internal user surveys have since then shown a slight increase again (Hansen 
2009, Hansen 2011). How this is related to the challenges in the focus on internal 
organizational development and problems in the collaborative arrangements discussed 
above is not easy to judge. In 2009 NAV was one of Norway’s less trusted public 
services (NSD 2010) and the public service with less satisfied users (DIFI-report 2010b). 
The NAV administration does not have a particularly good reputation either (DIFI-
report 2010a). 
An interesting observation in the evaluation program is that user satisfaction with the 
services is positively correlated with the number of services included in the local office 
(Christensen, Hansen & Aars 2011). In-depth-interviews with long-term NAV-users (on 
sick leave and unemployed) reveal, however, that they have experienced uncoordinated 
processing, unavailable officers and arbitrary use of measures, where it is random 
whether work/activity or some sort of disability social security is chosen as the final goal 
of their contact with NAV. Users claim that they have to act as their own coordinator in 
the NAV system (Lundberg 2011). In 2010 and 2011 NAV was the Norwegian public 
service institution against which the most official complaints were lodged. Nearly 20 
percent of all complaints submitted to the Parliamentary Ombudsman were against the 
NAV (Parliamentary Ombudsman‘s annual report 2010:27, 2011).3  
Cha l l enges ,  a c coun t ab i l i t y  and  r e f o rm  dynam i c s  
In this paper we have described the NAV reform as a joined-up-government effort in 
the Norwegian welfare system. We have discussed the three challenges identified in 
2007 as arising from the complicated arrangement of cross-sectorial coordination and 
central–local government collaboration (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007) and 
                                                 
3 Whether this is high, low or reasonable is not easy to have any qualified opinion about. Given that NAV is using 
more than one third of the budget of the state per year 20 % can be said to be low, but given that a high share of 
the money NAV uses are connected to pensions and individual rights based on more or less automatic criteria 20 
% can be regarded as rather high.  Only a more detailed project taking into consideration different aspects of the 
task portfolio of NAV and which part of this portfolio the claims mainly are connected to, can give sufficient 
answers here. 
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presented empirical data about how they have been coped with. This has revealed that 
horizontal coordination – both centrally and locally – seems to be more successful than 
the vertical coordination between levels in the complicated organizational arrangement 
which constitutes the NAV. Given this, can this joined-up-initiative be classified as a 
success or as a failure? One way to answer this question is to look at something else 
revealed by our data – namely, that the lines of accountability in the fields included also 
have been challenged. We will discuss these further below. 
The first challenge – to get the merged central agency to work properly – did not 
change the political accountability relations between the ministry and the NAV agency, 
but in practice the NAV agency improved its status, because it is large and complex and 
has a lot of resources compared to the ministry (Christensen 2011). This tends to pose 
challenges for the ministry concerning insight and information. More grey zones have 
also emerged in political–administrative relations. The agency complains about a lack of 
clear priorities and stable objectives from the ministry, which has been seen as 
unpredictable and practicing hands-on management with respect to politically salient 
issues. The increasing influence of the merged NAV agency also has implications for the 
relationship between the Parliament and the government, making the political leadership 
rely on the leadership of the agency for more than it could deliver. The professional 
accountability relationship has also been affected by the merger into a new agency, albeit 
more for some employees than others. This is somewhat problematic, because the 
process of developing a new common cultural identity is slow and vital for efficiency. 
The reorganization of the reform in 2008 primarily addressed administrative 
accountability, i.e. the relationship between the central leadership and the lower levels in 
the welfare administration. Through vertical structural integration – the establishment of 
large pension and administrative units on the regional level – the central level was 
strengthened overall, an effect also attributable to its rather tight regime of performance 
indicators directed towards the regional level (Breivik 2010). 
The second challenge, connected to the relationship between levels, involves the 
political accountability principle of local self-government via the mandatory partnership 
arrangements. The NAV reform represents an agency strategy focusing on partnership 
structures and trans-organizational elements. Such multi-agency arrangements represent 
shared responsibilities and organizational complexity (Byrkjeflot, Christensen and 
Lægreid 2012). The partnership model was supposed to solve the tension between 
ministerial accountability and local self-government. So the main focus was on political 
accountability and how to live with simultaneous accountability to local politicians in the 
municipalities and to politicians at the central government level. In this respect the 
partnership model turned out to be difficult to practice, since it tended to make 
accountability relations more ambiguous. In practice the central government had a 
strong position in the relationship and it was difficult to fulfil the idea of equal partners. 
Political accountability through local self-government thus came under pressure. The 
partnership model is therefore a quasi-solution and it is too early to say whether the way 
that it fulfils the aims of the reform is an innovation or not (Fimreite 2011). It does, 
however, have attractive elements for the local authorities, because it involves receiving 
additional central resources to solve local problems. 
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Administrative or managerial accountability was in the reform handled by allocating 
resources to control and bureaucratization of control systems. The management-by-
objectives-and-results system became more sophisticated as part of a more complex 
control system (Breivik 2010). There are, however, problems of goal focus, quality and 
responsibility. The MBOR system was not applied to the municipal part of the NAV 
system owing to the principle of local self-government (Breivik 2010). This is however 
not the same that there is none MBO in the local government part of the NAV office. 
Many places there are, but the goals and objectives are than set by the local, not the 
central, government level. 
The third challenge – to coordinate front-line service with user-oriented welfare 
offices – affects accountability relations first and foremost through the merging of three 
professional communities into local one-stop shops and the challenge this represents to 
their original professional identity; hence there has been some pressure to develop the 
career profile of a new NAV professional. This has taken time and been difficult. With 
respect to social accountability it is an improvement, especially regarding multi-service 
users and clients, but the effects for one-service users are more ambiguous. Generally 
there is more focus on client needs, but challenges in handling these have been reflected 
in an increase in complaints and dissatisfaction. The reorganization of the reform in 
2008 has tended to enhance legal accountability by focusing more on the rule of law, 
impartiality and equal treatment. The centralization to the regional level and re-
specialization have tended to increase knowledge of clients’ rights, improved the quality 
of information and brought about more equal case handling. 
Discussion 
Our presentation allows us to conclude that the main challenge in NAV has been and 
still is connected to collaboration between levels rather than between sectors. At both 
the central and the local levels the involved sectors are starting to cooperate more 
closely even though this has taken time. Our findings about collaboration in the NAV 
are therefore in line with results presented by Davis (2009) regarding local strategic 
partnerships in the UK. Here he reveals a strong partnership ethos sustaining a 
consensus over abstract goals and legitimizing the avoidance of political value conflicts. 
Thus consensus about partnership ethos caused the displacement of value conflicts 
which in turn enhanced silo practices and fragmented governance. The implication of 
this is that joined-up-government might remain intangible unless partners can also 
debate and resolve value conflicts (Hoggett 2006). Our findings also support findings by 
Martin (2010:347) that local government partners tend to continue to operate as delivery 
agents for national government, tied into its priorities through an elaborate system of 
centrally driven performance targets. (This might especially be the case if the formation 
of the partnership is the result of central government policy (Hodges 2012).  
Regarding accountability relations one important finding so far seems to be that tasks 
matter, in different ways. First, welfare administration is a highly salient area of policy 
and this tends to put political accountability up front. There seem to be clear limitations 
on how far one can go in constraining political accountability in such politicized areas 
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(Byrkjeflot, Christensen and Lægreid 2012). The political dynamics also tend to produce 
unstable trade-offs between accountability mechanisms. The reform shows that the 
accountability is not only shared and multidimensional, but also dynamic and hybrid. 
Second, accountability also varies from one service to another, and the acceptance of 
local variation in service provision is different in different areas (Fimreite 2011, 
Bogdanor 2010). Insurance and pensions are more like machine bureaucracies and have 
a stronger focus on legal accountability than social security or labour issues that allow 
for more local variation and discretion. Thus the spatial dimension and geographically 
based services are more relevant for some tasks than for others, and this has 
implications for the blending of different principles of specialization and accountability 
mechanisms. While hierarchical accountability might be better aligned with routine 
tasks, professional accountability might be more suitable for non-routine tasks (Romzek 
2000).  
This reform has revealed that traditional mandatory, hierarchically oriented political 
accountability needs to be supplemented by more voluntary horizontal accountability 
relations (Bovens 2007, Schillemans 2008), in our case related to the local partnership, in 
order to cover cross-cutting issues and activities transcending organizational borders. 
The problem with the hierarchical approach to political, administrative and managerial 
accountability is that it assumes a clear division between politics and administration. In 
practice, however, much of the work of the public administration is political and this 
tends to blur the politics/administration divide and make administrative and managerial 
accountability more difficult and demanding. The problem of many eyes or the 
accountability to whom question are crucial, implying that traditional vertical political 
accountability mechanisms have been supplemented with administrative/managerial 
accountability, legal accountability, professional accountability and social accountability. 
The accountability relationships are becoming increasingly complex and hybrid. One 
main challenge is to safeguard public accountability in a situation in which the 
government is increasingly acquiring a horizontal and multi-level character (Michels and 
Meijer 2008).  
The different types of joined-up government produce different accountability 
challenges (Richards 2001). Intractable problems will need accountability mechanisms 
that empower local people to be accountable for their actions. ‘Tame problems’ require 
accountability mechanisms that provide legitimacy for cross-boundary activities to 
achieve outcomes. Seamless services will challenge accountability relations on the 
interface between the new areas of seamless services and other aspects of public service. 
It is important to integrate accountability arrangements into the joined-up arrangements 
and to handle accountability as part of the answer to the question of public support for 
collective welfare services and not part of the problem.  
Joined-up-government normally implies diffused or shared accountability relations 
among a number of actors. This is especially the case when the tasks or outputs are 
difficult to separate and are highly interdependent (Boston and Gill 2011). The problem 
with this shared accountability is that it tends to become fuzzy. Instead of choosing 
between different accountability mechanisms we have to treat them as supplementary 
and complementary in a mixed political order that combines and blends different modes 
of governance (Olsen 2007). We have revealed a multiple accountability regime in which 
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the different accountability mechanisms do not substitute for each other (Schillemans 
2008). A new accountability regime with more complex, dynamic and layered 
accountability forms is emerging (cf. Streeck and Thelen 2005). A key challenge is how 
to handle hybrid accountability relations embedded in partly competing institutional 
logic. Multiple accountabilities may be appropriate solutions for an increasingly 
pluralistic governance system. Accountability is about managing diverse and partly 
conflicting expectations (Romzek and Dubnick 1987, Willems and Van Dooren 2011).  
In a joined-up government approach one has to go beyond the traditional forms of 
political accountability to close the ‘accountability gap’ that has emerged in the 
aftermath of NPM reforms (Flinders 2012). Democratic accountability has to be re-
thought in ways that resonate with the new reality of modern governance systems. 
Simply to reinstall conventional hierarchical principal-agent accountability relations is 
problematic in the current more fluid state. The hierarchical principal-agent approach of 
delegation and vertical channels of accountability needs to be supplemented with 
analyses of how multiple and hybrid accountability relations interact and change over 
time (Goetz and Jenkins 2001).  
Conclusion 
As things currently stand, five to six years after the decision was taken to implement the 
reform, NAV can hardly be proclaimed as an unqualified success. The idea behind the 
reform – to increase the capacity of government to cut across existing policy fields and 
in that way handle ‘wicked issues’ in the various welfare fields – is still struggling to be 
implemented. The main challenge seems to be to establish constructive cooperation 
between central and local authorities, related to a structural solution that is complex and 
hybrid. There are also still challenges connected to creating a coordinated front-line 
service with user-oriented employment and welfare offices – challenges that relate to a 
tension between roles and tasks, but also to professional competence and identity. The 
challenge of establishing a merged central government agency has, however, been more 
successfully handled.  
As accountability relations have become more blurred and ambiguous, it seems hard 
to live up to the intentions and ambitions in the joined-up-government approach. 
Political accountability is formally the same, but the central agency has also strengthened 
its position in many ways. Administrative accountability, through performance 
management has become more complex and challenging. Legal accountability is 
increasing first and foremost through standardization and formalization via the 
administrative units at regional level. Professional accountability still bears the tensions 
resulting from three formerly separate services with strong path-dependency struggling 
to integrate. Social accountability becomes challenging when user satisfaction lags 
behind expectations. A multi-dimensional accountability approach is needed to handle 
accountability in a pluralistic political–administrative system (Lægreid, forthcoming), but 
so far this has not evolved in the NAV reform. And that might be the greatest challenge 
for the reform in the years to come. 
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